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Interview: Sir Roderic Lyne

East-West relations are at their lowest ebb since the collapse of the USSR. Talking to the Oxford University International Relations Society, and then in an exclusive interview with Cherwell, Sir Roderic Lyne explained why. Lyne is the former British ambassador to Russia, having served during the period covering 9/11 and the Chechnyan war, and is currently Vice-Chairman of Chatham House, one of Britain’s most respected policy institutes. These positions have given him a unique insight the minds behind Russian high politics.

Russia, Lyne tells me, has an identity problem.

“Unlike the UK, which has been able to divest itself of empire over 30 years and come to accept its role as a middle power, for Russians, the collapse of the USSR came overnight. As such, despite having neither the economy nor military to justify it, they continue to perceive themselves as a truly global power and act accordingly.”

Russia thus considers former Soviet states as their “near abroad”, effectively part of the Russian motherland, and wishes to have a strong influence in these countries’ affairs. Such states have ongoing post-Cold War economic stability and national identity problems that Russia is able to exploit to enforce their subservience. As Lyne states, they were “simply not ready for independence”, and unresolved independence issues are a powerful tool in Putin’s arsenal.

Ukraine has been the latest example of this intervention. After the ex-Soviet republic slipped through Putin’s fingers with the forced departure of Victor Yanukovych, he exchanged carrots for sticks, invading Crimea and fostering ethnic conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions to prevent Ukraine from maintaining autonomy.

Lyne discussed Putin’s approach to international affairs in depth. Putin, in Lyne’s view, is “an opportunist, not a strategist. Putin does not think like a chess player, several moves ahead, but as a Judoka. He pushes to sense where his opponent is weak and exploits every weakness he finds to score a victory.” Thus, on Ukraine, he sensed an opportunity, and acted.

Russia, however, is far from alone in bearing the blame for the current crisis. Lyne describes the decision to offer NATO membership action plans to Georgia and Ukraine as “simply mad”, and bound to threaten the Russians. Sadly, he says, in reference to former Soviet NATO members, “Given we did not have any good reason to say no, we couldn’t really justify saying no to their membership at the time.” While Russia could do little to prevent Poland or the Baltic states turning west, when Georgia and Ukraine threatened to do the same, Russia acted.

So what’s next for Ukraine? For Lyne, a Ukraine “linked with the West but not threatening to Moscow, and with real Russian influence in Kiev” seems the most likely and stable outcome. Ukrainian NATO or EU membership is certainly not likely.

And Russia? Russia itself is likely to suffer economically, despite the rather superficial nature of Western sanctions. “Russian solvency depends on a high oil price, due to an extremely undifferentiated economy,” Lyne explained. Thus capital flight, a collapse in the rouble, and a relegation of Russian debt to near junk status has hit the Russian economy badly. Russian foreign reserve holdings have “taken a battering”, pushing it into predicted recession this year. Many foreign firms now see Russia as just too risky for investment.

Thus, while it might seem that Putin is riding high on popularity from reasserting Russian dominance, in the longer term, this crisis could threaten his vertical of power. He cannot simply continue to pay off the public without the capital to do so. For example, he cannot continue to increase Russian pension payments: “Once they go up, they are impossible to bring down without creating massive unpopularity.”

Overall, Lyne argues “we are not in a new Cold War”, but that steps need to be taken to resolve the issues on Russia’s border “to which Rus- sia has genuine claims”. I asked him whether he felt the EU’s failure to co- ordinate effectively on the issue of Ukraine threatened its ability to provide a coherent foreign policy in future.

“Actually, the policy coordination within the EU over Ukraine has been better than I expect- ed, led by Germany, and I think it has been re- ally interesting that the Germans under Angela Merkel’s leadership have taken a pretty strong line on Ukraine,” Lyne mused. “I don’t think the EU has done badly within the limits of its ability, but it’s never developed the ability to act as a single actor in foreign policy.” I quizzed him
on whether Russia’s declining power explained its lash out in Crimea.

“Russia is a declining power,” Lyne stressed. “It is not rapidly declining, but it is on an incremental decline because its economy is going downhill. It is now, as Obama said the other day, effectively a regional power, not a global power. I think the driver of the Ukraine crisis was that not just Putin, but generally all policy makers, need more voters in Russia. They think of Ukraine as part of the Russian motherland and therefore as an area while they do not believe should join Western blocs. They effectively want Ukraine to be subservient. That is the driver of the crisis.”

Speaking about the extent of British power, Lyne admitted, “There’s not a huge amount we can do. If we wish to exert influence on the situation, we have to throw our efforts together with those of our European partners, the United States and indeed more widely in the United Nations. We have a global network, and we should use that network to make sure that Russia knows that around the world, no serious country is ever going to endorse its annexation of Crimea. The Russians actually care about how the world thinks of them; they want to be respected in the world, they want to be part of the international status quo, and they know they have breached international law, and that is something that we can have a role in influencing.”

Finally, Lyne is pessimistic about future crises.“I think there is a very high likelihood that we will see further instalments, as this wasn’t the first, we have seen it in Georgia, and we have seen it in Moldova. Questions will arise at some point in the future on the orientation of Belarus. Belarus is a country that was, perhaps, even closer to Russia in some ways than Ukraine. It has a much less strong sense of nationhood than Ukraine, it is a weaker country economically, it is not a country which the West has ever shown much interest. But when the current dictator of Belarus, Lukashenko, loses power through one means or another, Belarus will come into play. Whoever is in power in Moscow at this stage will definitely want Belarus not to float off in the direction of the European Union.”

Further conflict with Russia is a risk in the international system, not because of its military might or aggressive foreign policy, but because Russia has failed to reconstruct its perception of itself as a global power. Rather, that idea has been renewed by united Russian nationalism. The challenge, it seems, for British foreign policy is to accommodate this self-perception, allowing for meaningful engagement without giving in to Russia’s aims.

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