When the first wave of protests initiated what is now known as the ‘Arab Spring’, Syria hardly featured. A few disturbances were easily quashed and the respected Arab broadcaster, Al Jazeera, even suggested that “a popular president, dreaded security forces and religious diversity make a Syrian revolution unlikely”.
How much difference a year makes. Violence has gradually escalated, sanctions have been imposed, ‘elections’ have taken place, and the Kofi Anan Peace Plan to impose a ceasefire was supposed to come into effect on 10th April 2012. Instead of peace, however, Syria now faces the prospect of a full blown civil war.
True, Bashar al-Assad’s government is extremely repressive: there is and has never been any real democracy, the human rights record is appalling and bloody massacres have been associated with the regime for decades. However, it is easy to forget that under the al-Assad rule, women’s rights are strongly respected and freedom of religion is greater than in perhaps any other country in the Middle East. The ruling élite are Alawite Muslims, a branch of Shia, and as a small minority group, the government has found it useful to promote other minorities, producing progressive results for perhaps the wrong reasons. There are a few Jews, then 10% of the population are Christian, 16% are Druze, Alawite and Shia, while the 74% majority are Sunni. However, it is from this religious mix that much of today’s trouble stems.
In Libya and Egypt there was a definite opposition and leaders willing to co-operate against the government. In Syria, this is not the case and co-ordination is still desperately lacking. The UN want dialogue with representative official figures, but with the pockets of resistance all fighting for different sects, different causes and in different demographics, the likelihood of success is low.
The Sunni-led Syrian National Congress has failed to win support from the large minority groups, who have resisted on the grounds that the SNC is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and unrepresentative of the rest. The Muslim Brotherhood are apparently strong supporters of democracy, of sexual equality and while their belief in internal discipline and support for Sharia law remains a worry to the West, their comparative moderation may be the best compromise in a post-Bashar government. But moderation seems a long way off; this is a part of the world where revenge is not just sweet, it is a duty. Alawite communities are petrified of repercussions should the Alawite-led regime fall. The most recent atrocities on civilians in Houla, are widely felt to have been the work of the Shabiha, the Alawite militia who support the regime, and revenge attacks are an ongoing concern.
But what of the ‘international community’? The ‘West’ is trying diplomatic pressure but will not get involved directly when no-one can see and end game, and the situation is one of such complexity. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia is willing to get involved. True, it has an unsavory record on human rights, democracy and the position of women, but it does sit on a quarter of the world’s oil reserves. Hilary Clinton considers it a “key partner and friend”, and like Britain, is happy to sell them arms on a grand scale: only last week, British defence giant BAE signed a £1.9bn deal to supply Hawk trainer jets.
As a strict Sunni monarchy, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states, now actively finance Syrian rebels and lobbying hard for the US to step up its involvement against the al-Assad regime. But with evidence of Al Qaeda participation, and many attacks carrying the hallmarks of those with bomb-making experience from Iraq, the US finds itself in a tricky situation. It is hard to see any outcome other than further descent into violence and bloody sectarian disaster. No group looks like it can win and yet no-one is prepared to recognize that they can’t.
Ironically, Russia, the regime’s key ally, could now be the key to a path towards a solution. The US and the UK have made their stance quite clear from the outset – that Bashar must go. This bold statement, however, gives little room for negotiation; with their backs against the wall the regime will want to fight to the death. Russia sees its involvement in other countries’ civil wars as a grave mistake and has so far resisted attempts at international action against Syria. But as its patience runs out with the Syrian government, Russia may be the only chance in persuading the al-Assad regime that it must give up, and that exile in Russia is their only hope.
Sadly for the moment, the only certainty is that Syria is beyond all imaginable realms of complexity. There are so many contributing factors, that anyone who claims to understand it almost certainly doesn’t, including myself.
Izzy Westbury lived for 3 years as an expat in Damascus, Syria, between 1998-2001. She was in Damascus when Bashar al-Assad came to power in the summer of 2000.
